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CHAPTER V111 : METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVES 
This chapter is an epilogue. It will, accordingly, be comparatively short. 
The only task we set ourselves is to state a few problems, in a meta- 
physical perspective. 
What we are giving here is not, therefore, a set of conclusions. For 
one thing, we do not consider n~etaphysics as fundamentally a conclusive 
formulation of the results of phenomenological analysis. Moreover, we 
have now insufficient data to evolve a metaphysical evaluation. 
For what we have analysed, as far as speech is concerned, is only the 
word, understood as described in Chapter r. We should need an anilysis 
of what a sentence really is and does, if we want to complete our data so 
as to make the transitus to a metaphysical system acceptable. Moreover 
we should need a more elaborate psychology of the structures of net- 
works of affective associations among meanings and, correlatively to those, 
of the sound-material involved. There would also have to be a phen- 
omenology of thought less exclusively evolved along lingua1 data than 
has been done in the present study. Finally, the designata, or referents, 
of the words would have to be extended so as to include more than only 
what is also the object of perception. And there are probably other 
items not falling within the scope of our study, as described in Chapters 
I and 11. 
It may be, perhaps, to a certain extent plausible to maintain that 
metaphysical investigations evince a deeper concern, on the part of the 
philosopher, with the whole of reality, and with some of its unfathom- 
able secrets, engrossing his mind; a deeper concern, that is, than that 
prompting the rather preparatory work of the phenomenologist. This 
concern is, of course, not itself necessarily a metaphysical avocation: it 
is characteristic of any man rising above the trivia1 in life and the ped- 
estrian attitude. It is because of this that a phenomenologist may start 
from a metaphysical problem without being guilty of an apriori in the 
methodical sense. His inspiration may be poles apart from premisses 
introduced by sleight of hand, as might be done, consciously or un- 
consciously, by someone wishing to make a point for which he does not 
have sufficient evidence. What is more, one of the aims of phenomen- 
ology should be, as we have suggested before, to put one's inspiration 
to the test in so unprejudiced a manner that i t  will gradually become 
possible to  find out  if one's fundamental inspiration is in actual fact poles 
apart from premisses introduced by sleight of hand. 
Our  own fundamental inspiration was of an outspokenly metaphysical 
description : i t  was the wish to fare safely between monism and dualism. 
It can also be expressed by saying that, though we supposed that there 
must be elements of truth in what various anthropologies have asserted 
about man, we could not be satisfied with what has been done so far. 
This is, of course, metaphysical in the sence that every philosopher 
realizes he is deeply influenced by the metaphysics he has become 
familiar with. There is, therefore, in our  view no apriori involved at al1 
except one's own attitude. And who can maintain that he is so un- 
prejudiced as to  be free from i t?  
Some questions 
In spite of the inadequacy (to a metaphysical elaboration) of the material 
analysed and of the evidence that has presented itself, i t  is nevertheless 
possible to  present ourselves and the reader with some problems, to the 
solution of which we do not propose to  contribute anything within the 
scope of this study. 
Let us first take speech itself as our central subject. It has become 
clear, we hope, that speech takes an intermediate place between polar 
elements, a sort of "half-way position". Some of these positions can be 
read from our  chart at the end of the book. Speech occupies a half-way 
position between "distance" and "proximity", between transcendence 
and immanence, between perception and thought, between rationality 
and irrationality. Other half-way positions, touched upon more o r  less 
incidentally in our  study are: between body and mind, exteriority and 
interiority, cognition and lived experience ; between sub-conscious and 
conscious, pre-reflexive and reflexive, antepredicative and predicative, 
lingua1 thought and free thought, productivity and r ep rodu~ t iv i t~ ,  im- 
mediacy of contact and instrumentality; between past and future, be- 
tween consciousness and freedom, between intersubjectivity and isol- 
ation. 
In spite of so many polarities i t  is unexpectedly easy to determine 
which of them has been, in our  analyses, most fundamental: i t  is the 
polarity of "distance" and "proximity". Our  view of this polarity, i t  will 
be remembered, came up of its own accord as soon as we found that our  
original working hypothesis of transcendence and immanence as the 
fundamental polarity in human existence proved untenable. On the other 
hand, it wil1 be needless to say that this conviction of ours is not suf- 
ficient at al1 to explain the structural features of the other polarities, 
notably those not occurring in our chart. Nor is it now our task to 
attempt such an explanation. W e  wish only to stress the need for it as a 
genuinely metaphysical problem. 
A second question could be what is the special function in, and influ- 
ence upon, the totality of human experience of what we called thought 
(or cognition) at first, narrowed down to rationality in its specific 
structure afterwards. W e  already mentioned nnimal rationaleas aparticul- 
arly one-sided definition of man. But, while we wish to pass over the 
problems affecting a total picture of man for the moment, we may now 
say that the one-sidedness of rationality is its allegiance to what we have 
called "distance" ever since Chapter 111. What, then, is the metaphysical 
impact of this "distance"? And would it be true to say that the mistake 
of a definition like anima1 rationale is precisely that transcendenceunjustly 
takes the place of "distance"? In other words: is the picture of man 
evoked by this definition too "vertical"? And if that is so, would the 
addition of "proximity" to this definition (in what form does not now 
concern US) restore the balance? 
A third problem is constituted by perception in connection with 
speech. Should we not suspect that the role of language has been for- 
gotten in philosophies of perception, as much as the role of perception 
has, perhaps, been forgotten in the philosophy of language?] 
Another intrigueing point is the one presented by the relation between 
man and things. The interesting feature has shown itself, in our analyses, 
that the "strangeness" of things is overcome by their being named. The 
name, in other words, remains with the thing itself, is "faithful" to it. 
But, as we have seen, no sooner does the name withdraw to the sphere 
of thought, than the words, or  terms (for that is what the name; have 
then become), assume a thing-like character themselves, thus giving rise 
to the experiences so wel1 described by Parain. Would it not follow 
i. Is there not a total forgetfulness of the half-way position of speech (viz. between knowledge, 
or thought, and perception) in the doctrine of the cognitio per conversionem ad phontasmata? Is there 
not as much, or even, perhaps, primarily, the problem of a cognitio per convenionem ad voces? And, 
apart from that, seeing that the best interpretation of the phantasma of the original adagc is, perhaps, 
what we have called the mental image, would it not follow that a much better formulation of the 
adage would be to speak of a cognirio per convenionem ad phanrosmatu visualia? OT, if we may leave 
scholasticism alone for a moment, and return to oor first reformulation of the converrio, is the 
apriori position of speech with regard to knowledge, forgotten as it has been in Kant's transcendental 
analysis, sufficiently wel1 recognized (apart from criticism, of course, of non-Kantians) in the 
philosophies of Vaihiiger, Cassirer, and Susanne Langer? 
that al1 that is thing-like intrudes upon our minds as soon as we wish to 
overcome its "strangeness" altogether? 
There is, further, the problem of space and time. It has harassed the 
minds of philosophers for so many centuries and nowadays, too, it is 
highly topical. Our analyses open up the question whether the "fore- 
groundn-"background" relations, as correlative to our activity in per- 
ception and in productivity in speech and thought, might not open up 
the way to a new determination of space and time as an existential 
"n~ilieu" of this activity and of this productivity? 
A favourite metaphysical topic would, naturally, be the problem of the 
one and the many. It may have become clear that, when we spoke of the 
"one" as characteristic of "foreground" and the multiple as characterizing 
"background", we did not have anything like the problem of Parmenides 
in mind at all. We were only giving a description in which the "one" as 
"constituted" by perception evoked its polar opposite of the multiple as 
characteristic of "background". Nevertheless, seeing that Aristotelian- 
Thomistic thought explains the multiple by having recourse to matter as 
principle of individuation, the question arises in how far primary experi- 
ence is affected by the multiple as by something as much akin to "alien- 
ation" as the Aristotelian notion of "matter". In other words: could 
there be anything in primary experience which, when unjustly trans- 
lated int0 metaphysical concepts, gives rise to the gnostic attitude from 
which the hylomorphic position can hardly be separated? 
And what, we ask next, could be the metaphysical impact of the 
cognitive primacy of the spatial and the visual? It may be answered that 
they constitute the mundane correlative of the "distance"-features of our 
knowledge and thought. This would be a metaphysical statement if 
"distance" is taken as a metaphysical term. But this could only be really 
helpful if "distance", as wel1 as its polar opposite "proximityn is in some 
way or other confronted with other major metaphysical notions. Is there 
not a parallellism with logos and mythos? Or, at least, should we not begin 
our investigations here? 
And thisWbrings us to a more or less total picture of man, for, whether 
it can be helped or not, modern philosophy has made the anthropology 
of body and mind look rather suspicious. What we want nowadays is a 
picturé, free from the sins of dualiim. On the other hand, there dies not 
seem to be any philosophy that can do without the distinction of polar 
elements. Polarities are not generally distrusted nowadays. It wil1 make 
for communicability of any philosophy to make an honest attempt to 
reconcile polarity and unity in the existence of man. We have pointed 
out that this is best done by considering; our existence as it is in actual 
fact, as developing dynamically. The polarities revealed in this study are 
tensions. And a tension is between two: what we have been after is the 
dualjty in man, we have tried to find out how this duality is structured; 
and particularly, how this duality shows itself in speech. 
We are of opinion that the basic polarity revealed in our analyses 
is that of "proximity" and "distance". Though we have analysed the kind 
of existence that would in principle appeal to any one's experience - so 
far as we can be sure at al1 - as "normal", we have not sketched an 
"ideal" picture of man. In other words: we have neither idealized 
"proximity" nor depreciated "distance". W e  never said that the tensions, 
giving rise to our development as human beings are always in harmony. 
As we said in one place, if anyone should be inclined to remark that 
always having to choose (whether consciously o r  unconsciously) is like 
having to shift one's position, time and again, from the one sore leg on to 
the other, that remark would not be wrong. There is no other way. 
It is not, we think, the phenomenologist's task to describe our existence 
as he thinks i t  ought CO be, but only and exclusively as it is. Even the 
ethica1 philosopher wil1 have to take this at least for his point of de- 
parture. 
Could it be that impatience of dualism goes hand in hand, in some 
cases, with an impatience with the kind of duality we have been sketch- 
ing? Is i t  just possible that philosophers pursue a monistic approach out 
of impatience with the uncertainties in life? If it is true that metaphysi- 
cians are apt to present a too conclusive, too definitive picture of man, 
could an entirely unphilosophical attitude as indicated here be at  least 
in part responsible? 
Even apart from the question whether this latter problem still belongs 
within the province of metaphysics, we do not suggest an answer. For 
even within the compass of the ambitious program announced by the 
metaphysical questions we have asked, this would be too daring. If the 
reader finds himself asking the same questions as we have asked, we shall 
fee1 honoured to share with him one of the most fundamental preoccup- 
ations man is fated, and privileged, to have. 
